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Editors’Summary
The brookings panel ON Economic Activity held its seventy-fourth
conference in Washington, D.C., on September 5 and 6, 2002. This issue
of Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers and dis-
cussions presented at the conference. The first paper reviews the process
and methods of inflation and output forecasting at four central banks and
proposes strategies for improving the usefulness of their formal economic
models for policymaking. The second paper analyzes the implications for
monetary policymaking of uncertainty about the levels of the natural rates
of unemployment and interest. The third paper examines reasons for the
recent rise in current account deficits in the lower-income countries of
Europe and the role of economic integration in breaking the link between
domestic saving and domestic investment. The fourth paper applies a new
decomposition of productivity growth to a new database of income-side
output to examine the recent speedup in U.S. productivity growth and the
contribution made by new economy industries.
Despite a growing transparency in the conduct of monetary policy at
many central banks, little is still known publicly about the actual process
of central bank decisionmaking. In the ﬁrst paper of this issue, Christopher
Sims examines this process, drawing on interviews with staff and policy
committee members from the Swedish Riksbank, the European Central
Bank, the Bank of England, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. Central bank
policy actions are inevitably based on forecasts of inflation and output.
Sims’interviews focused on how those forecasts are made, how uncer-
tainty is dealt with, and what role formal economic models play in the
process. In the case of the Federal Reserve, a history of subjective and
model-based forecasts is publicly available, allowing Sims to evaluate
and compare their performance both with each other and with private fore-
casts. He offers observations about how the performance of large econo-
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them could be made more useful to policymakers.
Sims begins with an informative overview of the process that takes
place at each of the central banks before policy decisions are made. Within
each institution, a policy round proceeds through a number of meetings
among staff through which a forecast is arrived at iteratively, but the num-
ber of meetings, the way discussions are ordered, and the involvement of
policy board members all vary. At the Federal Reserve, staff prepare the
forecasts without policy board participation. At the other central banks
there is typically some involvement of the policy board, and at the Bank of
England some board members attend the meetings from the earliest stages.
Each central bank has a primary macroeconomic model (the Riksbank
has two) that is used to construct projections of the economy conditional
upon various assumptions about future disturbances or policies; each also
informally uses one or more secondary models. Sectoral experts play a
major role at all four central banks. At the Federal Reserve their forecasts
are compared with those from the primary model, and discrepancies serve
as a basis for further discussion and possible adjustment of the primary
model’s forecast. The Federal Reserve’s Green Book and the Bank of Eng-
land’s inflation reports summarize the results of the forecasting process
and present a variety of potential time paths for the economy, which serve
to communicate forecasting uncertainty. Other central banks also typically
consider a range of outcomes.
Sims examines the situation at the Federal Reserve in greater detail than
the others, analyzing the accuracy of the staff forecasts for inflation and
output. These are publicly available, with access restricted only by a ﬁve-
year nondisclosure rule. He expands in several ways on a recent study of
the judgmental Green Book forecasts by Christine Romer and David
Romer, adding four or five years of data, including the Federal Reserve’s
model-based forecasts in the assessment, and comparing both sets of fore-
casts with private forecasts. Through 1995 the model-based forecasts were
based on the MIT-Penn-SSRC (MPS) model, developed in a collaborative
academic effort and maintained by the Federal Reserve staff. Since then,
model forecasts have been based on the new FRB/US model developed
within the Federal Reserve. Sims compares both the Green Book and the
model-based forecasts with forecasts from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) and with a naïve forecast that assumes no change from
the current quarter. 
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straightforward is to calculate the root mean square errors (RMSE) of fore-
casts from actual outcomes, which Sims does for each of the four quar-
ters following the forecast. For the inflation forecasts, he finds, as did the
Romers, that the Green Book has the smallest errors at all horizons. The
MPS forecast consistently ﬁnishes in second place except in the case of the
one-quarter forecast; the naïve forecast does better than the SPF at every
horizon. (The naïve forecast has the advantage of utilizing actual data for
the current quarter, which are not available for the other forecasts.) How-
ever, the differences among forecasts, especially that between the Green
Book and the MPS, are not large. Sims tests to see whether these differ-
ences in performance are statistically significant. He finds strong evidence
of Green Book superiority over the SPF model in forecasting inflation at
both the one- and the four-quarter horizon, but only weak evidence of its
superiority over the MPS model. 
Sims also compares the forecasts’performance at predicting growth in
output, still using RMSE as the criterion. Here the naïve forecasts do
poorly, despite their informational advantage, and the SPF forecasts rank
better than they did in forecasting inflation, slightly outperforming the
MPS forecasts. Although the Green Book forecasts are still the best at all
horizons, their advantage over the MPS and SPF forecasts is quite small
and not statistically signiﬁcant. The Green Book’s biggest advantage is at
a horizon of three quarters, where its RMSE is 3.2 percentage points, com-
pared with 3.37 and 3.43 percentage points for the SPF and the MPS,
respectively. 
A second basis for comparison is provided by the correlations of the
different forecasts with actual outcomes. The square of the correlation
coefﬁcient measures the fraction of the actual variance that is explained by
a regression of actual values on forecasts. Whereas the RMSEs are ele-
vated by bias and the failure of forecasts to move proportionately with
actual values, a regression with a freely estimated intercept and coefﬁcient
removes these two sources of error. If a policymaker were limited to using
a single forecast, and used the regression equation to account for bias and
scaling error, the forecast with the highest correlation would be the most
informative. In the case of inﬂation, all the forecasts are quite highly cor-
related with actual values: they explain over 80 percent of the variance in
inﬂation at a horizon of one quarter and over 65 percent of the variance at
four quarters. Again the Green Book forecasts perform best, explaining
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Green Book inflation forecast achieves a lower RMSE even though both
the MPS and the naïve forecasts have lower bias, and that the Green Book
looks even better in the correlation comparisons. As measured by correla-
tions, none of the candidates do as well at forecasting GDP growth as
they do at forecasting inflation. But whereas the forecasts did not differ
greatly when compared by RMSE, the differences in correlations are more
pronounced. The Green Book, which had the lowest RMSE, also has the
highest correlation, explaining 17 percent of actual growth four quarters
out. The SPF, which had the second-best RMSE, explains only 6 percent at
that horizon, and the MPS only 10 percent. 
A third way to characterize the value of the forecasts is by their indi-
vidual contribution in a multivariate regression that includes all forecasts.
The Romers, following Ray Fair and Robert Shiller, refer to this sort of
regression as measuring the “information content” of forecasts. In the case
of inﬂation, such a regression for four-quarter-ahead forecasts results in a
large and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the Green Book forecast and insigniﬁ-
cant coefficients on the others (the estimated coefficient on the SPF fore-
cast is negative). For four-quarter-ahead output growth, the results are
similar, with a coefﬁcient of 1.4 on the Green Book forecasts and a nega-
tive but insignificant coefficient on the MPS forecast. Sims suggests that
such equations are useful if interpreted carefully, but he questions whether
they should be characterized as providing information content. He illus-
trates the general point with a model in which the variable of interest is a
linear function of one or more forecastable components plus error, and
the forecasts are different, noisy estimates of these components. With one
forecastable component, the regression coefﬁcients will all be positive, but
their magnitudes will depend inversely on the error in the relationship of
each to the forecastable component. Sims points out that the difference in
relative sizes of the coefﬁcients can be extreme even though the forecasts
have very similar forecast error variances. With two forecastable compo-
nents the interpretation becomes even more problematic. In this case, even
though the common component of error is small and very similar among
forecasts, the coefficients can be of opposite sign and grow larger as the
forecasts become more similar. The coefﬁcients give the optimal weights for
a best forecast using a linear combination of the individual forecasts. Those
weights have no reliable relationship to any individual forecast’s quality.
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forecasts? Sims explores three possibilities: better use of time-series data
available to all, access to information not publicly available about the Fed-
eral Reserve’s own likely policy actions, or access to better detailed infor-
mation about current price developments. These hypotheses correspond
to testable restrictions on a vector autoregression (VAR). When the Green
Book inﬂation forecasts are included in a standard quarterly VAR with four
lags each of output, the price deflator, the federal funds rate, the com-
modity price index, and the interest rate on three-year Treasury bonds, they
make a substantial contribution to the fit. The coefficients on the Green
Book forecast are highly significant in the equations for the deflator and
the federal funds rate, even though the VAR includes data not available at
the time those forecasts were made. This suggests that the forecast’s suc-
cess is not due to the Federal Reserve making better use of publicly avail-
able information. 
In the VAR for the federal funds rate, the coefﬁcient on the Green Book
forecast of inflation is strongly positive and not significantly different
from 1. Sims notes that this is consistent with the view that the Federal
Reserve responds to its own forecast of inflation and that its forecasts
contribute to the prediction of other variables through their contribution
to forecasting interest rates. Further supporting this view is the fact that
when the actual value of the federal funds rate is included in the VAR, the
evidence that the Green Book inflation forecasts influence the other vari-
ables is weak. Sims ﬁnds this pattern of results consistent with the idea that
the Federal Reserve’s advantage in forecasting arises from getting useful
information sooner, perhaps including, most importantly, information
about its own policy actions. 
As already noted, the subjective judgments of experts play an important
role in the preparation of forecasts at all of the central banks. The econo-
mists Sims interviewed believe the main value of these inputs is in pro-
viding a more accurate picture of the current state of the economy, and
therefore a more accurate starting point for forecasts, than a model based
on a limited set of data available only at monthly or quarterly intervals.
They argued that experts pay attention to a large amount of data from dis-
parate sources, some of it nonquantitative, and that they understand the
implications of such information for aggregates or for related data that
are used in econometric models but that become available only with a
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above. Sims does not see this role diminishing with time. As the econ-
omy changes and new economic problems arise, new data will be needed
that cannot be easily or quickly incorporated into an econometric model.
He suggests that unusual events are a second reason for using subjective
inputs from experts. An oil crisis, an attack on a currency, a September 11,
or simply a data collection error—such events are not best treated as sim-
ple draws from a historical distribution of random disturbances. Precisely
because they are unique or unusual, analysis of such events inevitably
involves an element of subjective judgment. 
Much of Sims’paper consists of a critical review of the history, current
state, and use of statistical modeling for macroeconomic policy. He dis-
cusses separately the evolution of central bank models over the last thirty
years, the difficulties of incorporating modern developments in theory
and econometric practice into policy modeling, and the need to better inte-
grate stochastic modeling with decisionmaking under uncertainty. In addi-
tion, he provides a detailed assessment of the primary econometric models
currently in use and suggests directions for improvements. This critique
is full of insightful and provocative observations that will be only briefly
summarized here. 
Sims notes that, because econometrics and macroeconomics were
active research areas throughout the period, one might have hoped to
observe clear progress in moving from the early simultaneous-equations
models to the models used today. He concludes, however, that the evolu-
tion of modeling technique over this period does not represent progress.
He traces this failure to the fact that academic research has largely ignored
the difficulties of modeling for macroeconomic policy conducted in real
time, and that central bank researchers have tried to adopt modern devel-
opments such as rational expectations theory, calibration, and unit-root
econometrics, which apply very awkwardly to policy modeling problems.
He ﬁnds that VAR modeling, with which he himself is closely associated,
is also ill suited to policy modeling in important respects. 
Sims discusses several features of policy modeling that are awkward
both for traditional simultaneous-equations econometrics and for these
newer approaches. He concurs with many other practitioners that real-time
forecasting and policy analysis require processing a great many variables.
This explains why the number of variables in central bank models is large
relative to the number of observations and why, as a consequence, statis-
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the relevant scale have a similar problem. Maintaining a large-scale model
requires a large team of researchers and a way of drawing on specialized
sectoral knowledge. This leads banks to decentralize modeling and fore-
casting responsibilities and to allocate responsibility for sectors to indi-
vidual economists. Although this setup provides useful real-time
knowledge, it compromises other properties of the model as a whole. Sec-
toral experts are often responsible for individual equations of the overall
model, and little attention is given to the properties of the resulting sys-
tem of equations. The result can be a system with poor long-term proper-
ties. Sims cites as an example the Federal Reserve’s Global model, which
ties together the FRB/US model with models for thirty other countries.
There is no well-defined solution to the resulting full system, which,
besides raising questions of the model’s logical consistency, means the
model cannot be solved in its “forward-looking” mode. 
Sims observes that the theoretically ideal policy model would be
derived from a theory of the behavior of economic agents who interact to
generate equilibrium. But models that meet this ideal and are practically
soluble need to be relatively small and contain only a small number of
sources of stochastic disturbance. Such small models do not fit the data
nearly as well as less restricted models and are at a severe disadvantage
in forecasting. Although this may not concern academic researchers, it
has been a major concern of central banks. Their own research efforts have
made little progress, however. While acknowledging the inherent difﬁcul-
ties, Sims is quite critical of the compromises made in various central bank
models to retain features of forward-looking equilibrium models while
attempting to maintain reasonable real-time performance. As he sees it,
in trying to incorporate a more rigorous foundation, central banks have
given up any serious effort to fit the data. Yet even the improvement in
rigor is largely illusory. 
For decisionmaking under uncertainty, Sims argues that simple
axiomatics as well as the intuition of most decisionmakers leads to think-
ing of everything that is unknown, including parameter values and even
which model is correct, as subject to probability calculations. He is dis-
turbed to find that central bank economists, most of whom have conven-
tional, non-Bayesian training, regard this kind of odds calculation as
unscientiﬁc. As an example, he cites the question of whether productivity
growth accelerated in the 1990s. Researchers he interviewed thought that
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hypothesis of no change as true until it was rejected at a 5 percent signiﬁ-
cance level. But the policymakers they worked for wanted to weigh the
probability of a change in growth against the cost of erring in either direc-
tion—either finding no change when there had in fact been one, or find-
ing a change when in fact there had been none. Sims regards the fact that
these elementary applications of Bayesian decision theory were seen as
unscientiﬁc as an indictment of the way econometrics is now being taught. 
Sims provides a detailed discussion of the advantages of a Bayesian
perspective on inference. He sees the most persuasive argument for the
Bayesian perspective as its ability to make apparently intractable inference
problems tractable. That ability, he argues, is increasing. He cites recent
work by Frank Smets and Raf Wouter using advanced simulation tech-
niques for Bayesian analysis as the first example of a dynamic stochastic
general-equilibrium model that produces a fit to data that is competitive
with a Bayesian reduced-form VAR. And he suggests that, with their sub-
stantial resources, central banks’research staffs should be able to suc-
cessfully estimate rigorous dynamic versions of today’s central bank
primary models. At a more applied level, Sims emphasizes the general
applicability of the Bayesian perspective for policymaking. It provides a
natural way of taking into account that a model’s parameters may drift
over time, and it offers a much less complex way for making inferences
about unit roots and cointegration than non-Bayesian methods provide.
Sims notes that decisionmaking depends on judgment as well as on infer-
ence from the data, and the Bayesian perspective formalizes the interaction
of the two. When a policymaker confronts results from models that give
conflicting forecasts, he or she does not want to be told that no probabil-
ity weights can be given to the models. But a non-Bayesian has no way of
assigning probabilities across several models, all of which fit historical
data reasonably well but have different implications for policy. The
Bayesian perspective is thus, in Sims’view, the essence of decisionmak-
ing, which weighs uncertain prospects to compare the expected conse-
quences of different courses of action. 
The Federal Reserve Act enjoins the U.S. central bank to pursue max-
imum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.
Although low inflation and low unemployment are both thus objectives
of policy, economic events often reveal a conflict between them, at least
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in NAIRU or Phillips equations, which relate the current rate of inﬂation to
the gap between the level of output or employment and its full-employ-
ment value, and to past or expected rates of inflation. Even economists
skeptical of the NAIRU or Phillips relationships are likely to believe that
there will be upward pressure on prices when output exceeds its potential
and downward pressure when output is signiﬁcantly below potential. It is
therefore natural that rules for the conduct of monetary policy specify
that the interest rate on federal funds, the Federal Reserve’s principal pol-
icy instrument, should depend on the gaps between actual and desired
values of inflation and unemployment. Such rules also typically include
the “natural rate of interest,” the real interest rate that is taken to be con-
sistent with desired rates of employment and inflation. For example,
according to the Taylor rule, perhaps the best known of proposed monetary
policy rules, the federal funds rate should increase more than one for one
with increases in inflation and decrease with a positive employment or
output gap. Interestingly, although policy has never been formally guided
by any rule, the response coefﬁcients for the Taylor rule that some recom-
mend using to conduct policy provide a reasonably good description of
actual behavior of the Federal Reserve for much of the post–World War II
period. In the second paper of this issue, Athanasios Orphanides and John
Williams argue that uncertainty about key parameters in such policy
rules—the natural rate of unemployment and the natural rate of interest—
is a major problem. They show that the optimal policy response to unem-
ployment and inﬂation in conventional rules is signiﬁcantly altered by such
uncertainty, and they propose a particular rule that they find to be robust in
the face of it. 
The authors first illustrate the problem of uncertainty in the context of a
simple Taylor rule that has performed quite well in model-based evalua-
tions. This rule sets the federal funds rate equal to the policymaker’s esti-
mate of the natural rate of interest if the unemployment gap (actual
unemployment minus the natural rate of unemployment) is zero and inﬂa-
tion is at the policymaker’s target. The federal funds rate is then increased
by half of any excess of inflation over the target and decreased one for
one with the unemployment gap. With this rule a 1-percentage-point over-
estimate either of the natural rate of interest or of the natural rate of unem-
ployment will result in the funds rate being set 1 percentage point too high,
an economically signiﬁcant error. 
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that mitigate such errors. First, they include the change in unemployment
from the previous period while reducing the weight placed on the unem-
ployment gap and hence the importance of errors in estimates of that gap.
Second, they incorporate policy inertia by only partly adjusting the federal
funds rate to the perceived natural rate of interest in each period; this
dampens the response to errors in those perceptions. This rule nests the
simple Taylor rule as one special case and insulates policy from misper-
ceptions of either natural rate as another. In the latter case the rule becomes
what the authors call a difference rule, relating the change in the federal
funds rate to the inﬂation gap and the change in unemployment. 
How much to insulate policy from errors in estimates of the natural
rates depends on the magnitude of those errors. The authors point to abun-
dant evidence that the natural rates vary signiﬁcantly over time. They cite
previous work suggesting that changes in demographics, the efﬁciency of
job matching, productivity, openness to trade, and the incidence of dis-
ability and incarceration all influence the natural rate of unemployment,
and that ﬁscal policy and household preferences inﬂuence the natural rate
of interest. The authors report that other analysts, in estimations that
assume constant natural rates, have found confidence intervals of 2 to
4 percentage points for the natural rate of unemployment and 3 to 4 per-
centage points for the natural rate of interest. Allowing for a stochasti-
cally time-varying natural interest rate yields confidence intervals twice
that large. And the authors believe that even these underestimate the true
uncertainty because they ignore whether the model itself and the way it
was estimated are appropriate. 
To provide a sense of the importance of these further uncertainties,
Orphanides and Williams present estimates over several decades of the
time-varying natural rate of unemployment from five previous studies by
different authors, along with their own estimates. The latter use both pop-
ular univariate ﬁlters that simply estimate a time-varying trend, as well as
multivariate models in which the unobserved natural rates are assumed to
follow a random walk. The authors estimate the natural unemployment
rate with two such models. One uses Kalman ﬁlter estimation of a NAIRU
model relating inflation to the unemployment gap, lagged inflation, and
relative oil and nonoil import price inflation. The other is a simple accel-
erationist Phillips curve estimated using methods proposed by Laurence
Ball and Gregory Mankiw. The authors also use a Kalman ﬁlter to estimate
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ployment gap to the real interest rate gap while imposing the condition that
inﬂation is stable if both gaps are zero. 
Orphanides and Williams report that, over a wide range of studies,
including their own, even “retrospective” estimates—those based on the
entire sample period—show significant variation in the natural rates over
time. The estimated values of both rates are generally low toward the end
of the 1960s, rise through the 1970s, and trend downward thereafter,
returning in the late 1990s to levels near those of the late 1960s. There is
also significant period-by-period variation across investigators and meth-
ods. For the natural rate of unemployment the range of estimates exceeds
2 percentage points in 1960, 1970, and 2000, and 3 percentage points in
1980. Only in the 1990s are the various estimates reasonably close to
each other, in a range from 5.8 to 6.4 percent. 
From the perspective of policymakers, matters are even worse. Policy
has to be based not on retrospective estimates but on “real-time” or “one-
sided” estimates, which use only data available when decisions are made.
The authors document the differences between real-time and retrospec-
tive estimates of both natural rates for their univariate and multivariate
models. Not surprisingly, the real-time estimates are noisier, especially in
the earlier periods when fewer observations are available. For the early
1980s the variation across models is especially wide, with estimates of
the natural rate of unemployment differing by almost 4 percentage points,
and those of the natural rate of interest by more than 9 percentage points.
The univariate ﬁlter estimates are particularly noisy. Furthermore, the real-
time estimates of the natural rates contribute little to the accuracy of fore-
casts of inflation. A one-quarter-ahead inflation forecast using the most
successful estimate of the natural rate has a standard error of 1.1 percent-
age points compared with a standard error of 1.2 percentage points for a
simple fourth-order autoregressive forecast. Forecasts of the unemploy-
ment rate using estimates of the natural rate of interest are only slightly
better than those from a simple second-order autoregression. 
The authors use the difference between the real-time and retrospective
estimates of the natural rates as a measure of perception error by policy-
makers. Over the range of models they consider, the standard deviations of
these perception errors range from roughly 
1⁄2 to 
3⁄4 of a percentage point for
the natural rate of unemployment and from 0.9 to 1.7 percentage points for
the natural rate of interest. Within each model, errors for both rates are
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cent. The authors again note that these indicators of misperception still sig-
nificantly understate the true uncertainty confronting policymakers, both
because the retrospective estimates are themselves subject to sampling
error and because the identity of the true model is uncertain. To give an
idea of the importance of model uncertainty, they compute the errors that
would be made using any one of their six models’real-time estimates if
any one of the other models’retrospective estimates were the true one.
Even from this restricted set of models, the range of perception errors
increases substantially in this cross-model calculation, with the median
standard deviation of the perception error for both natural rates at or above
the largest errors from the within-model calculations just described. 
Armed with these insights, the authors turn to their key question: how
does uncertainty about the natural rates affect economic performance
under various monetary policy rules? To answer this question, the authors
need a model of inflation and unemployment, including the way both of
these respond to the federal funds rate. They also need estimates of the dis-
tribution of shocks to the model, including the covariance of those shocks
with the perception errors of policymakers using the policy rule. The
authors focus most of their attention on a two-equation model that com-
bines forward-looking elements with inertia in both inflation and unem-
ployment. Inflation is a linear function of expected inflation in the next
period and last period’s inflation, with weights summing to one, and the
expected value of the unemployment gap, which is calculated from the ret-
rospective Kalman filter estimate of the natural unemployment rate. In
the model, the unemployment gap depends on the expected unemployment
gap in the next period, two lags of that gap, and the lagged real interest rate
gap calculated from the retrospective Kalman filter estimate of the nat-
ural interest rate. For the expected rates of inﬂation and unemployment the
authors use the median forecasts from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters. Estimates of this model for the period 1969:1 to 2002:2 give sen-
sible results. The unemployment equation weights expected and lagged
inflation about equally. A 1 percent increase in the unemployment gap
reduces the rate of inflation by about a third of a percent in the short run.
The interest rate gap is statistically signiﬁcant in the unemployment equa-
tion; the response of the unemployment rate to this gap is small in the short
run, but in the long run it exceeds 1 percent for a 1 percent change in the
interest rate. 
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misperceptions of the natural rates. As discussed earlier, a simple Taylor
rule weights such errors heavily, whereas a difference rule is insensitive
to such errors. The authors evaluate the performance of these and other
rules using several alternative estimates of errors in natural rate percep-
tions: a benchmark that assumes errors are zero; an error process for the
rates implied by the Kalman ﬁlter models; and errors that are two and three
times the Kalman filter–based estimates. In light of the model and esti-
mation uncertainties discussed above, the authors believe the last of these
are probably the most realistic. 
The performance of a given policy rule depends on shocks of different
sorts, including errors in the equations for inflation and unemployment,
innovations in the natural rates, and errors in perception. The covariances
as well as the variances of these errors are potentially important. The
authors compute the appropriate variance-covariance matrix, finding,
among other things, that misperceptions of the real natural interest rate are
positively correlated with shocks to the unemployment rate and with mis-
perceptions of the natural rate of unemployment, and that misperceptions
of the latter are negatively correlated with shocks to inﬂation. The authors
assume the policymaker has a loss function that is quadratic in the devia-
tion of inﬂation from its target rate, the deviation of the unemployment rate
from its natural rate, and the change in the short-run interest rate. They use
this loss function in evaluating the performance of several policy rules
including the original Taylor rule, the generalized rule discussed earlier
that allows partial adjustment of the federal funds rate and includes the
change in unemployment, and their difference rule. 
The authors first compare the performance of Taylor rules specified
with various parameter values, including those originally suggested by
Taylor, those that minimize loss in the absence of perception error, those
that minimize loss using the perception errors from a correctly specified
Kalman ﬁlter model, and those that minimize loss using errors that are two
and three times that size. For each of these parameter sets, they then com-
pute the expected loss for each of the alternative assumptions about per-
ception error. When perception errors are zero, the original Taylor rule
performs quite well, nearly as well as when the rule parameters are opti-
mized for this environment. The optimal parameters in the absence of
perception errors place much greater weight on the unemployment gap
than the original Taylor rule and less weight on inflation. However, with
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xxi
1017-00a  Editors  Sum    12/30/02    14:45    Page  xxithese parameters the Taylor rule is highly vulnerable to errors in percep-
tion. It is least vulnerable to such errors when set to its original parameter
values, because these are the least responsive to the output gap. Yet even
with these parameters, the loss when errors are from the Kalman ﬁlter esti-
mates is roughly double what it is when errors are zero. With Kalman ﬁl-
ter errors, the loss using the Taylor rule optimized for no errors is almost
triple the loss of the original Taylor rule. In contrast, the rule optimized for
the Kalman ﬁlter errors pays only a small penalty if in fact errors are zero,
and it is much less vulnerable to perception errors two or three times as
large as those from the Kalman ﬁlter estimates. 
These results suggest an important asymmetry. In the authors’examples
the cost of underestimating misperceptions is signiﬁcantly greater than the
cost of overestimating them. Policy rules optimized on the assumption that
perception errors are small are characterized by large responses to the
unemployment gap, which can be very costly. Overestimating perception
errors, on the other hand, leads to timid responses, but this is not very
costly. Several other generalizations are apparent from the authors’results.
Although the weight assigned to interest rate variability in the loss func-
tion is small, it contributes noticeably to loss because the rule causes inter-
est rates to vary a great deal. The standard deviation of the quarterly
change in rates is greater than 2.8 percentage points in the ﬁrst three cases,
and it exceeds 4 percentage points for the rule optimized for the Kalman
filter perception errors. As the degree of uncertainty rises, the optimal
weight on the unemployment gap shrinks toward zero, and the weight on
inflation gradually increases. Finally, at any of the parameter values con-
sidered, the difference rule dominates simple Taylor rules unless percep-
tion errors are in fact very small. This ﬁnding leads the authors to favor this
rule as “robust.”
The authors go on to consider the performance of a more ﬂexible, gen-
eralized rule that allows various amounts of policy inertia and introduces
changes in unemployment as an additional variable. In seeking the optimal
parameters for this rule, they ﬁnd that, as the degree of misperception rises,
the optimal amount of inertia and the weight on the change in unemploy-
ment increase rapidly whereas the weight on the unemployment gap
rapidly declines. The weight on inflation varies relatively little. When the
generalized rule is optimized for the uncertainty associated with the
Kalman filter model, it performs quite well over the full range of percep-
tion errors. It does modestly better than the robust rule for errors less than
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errors. 
The authors recognize that their results may be sensitive to their speci-
ﬁcation of the economic model determining inﬂation and unemployment.
To explore this sensitivity, they perform their experiments under two alter-
native specifications. One is a “new synthesis” model that is entirely for-
ward looking, with no lagged values for inflation or unemployment. The
other is a backward-looking “accelerationist” model with no expectational
variables. They find that the robust rule does quite well in the new
synthesis model, generally outperforming the generalized Taylor rule.
However, the robust rule does not do well in the backward-looking accel-
erationist world: it performs substantially worse than the generalized Tay-
lor rule except at the highest levels of misperception. Given the economic
profession’s lack of agreement on how to specify the economic models
used for policy analysis, it is disconcerting that the authors’conclusions
are so sensitive to the choice of model. 
The authors’experiments indicate that misperceptions of the natural
rates can be quite costly, particularly if policymakers are overconfident
about their knowledge of those rates. The costs of overconfidence are
likely to be greatest when the natural rates change significantly, so that
the errors in policymakers’real-time estimates are likely to be large. The
stagﬂationary period of the 1970s and the boom of the 1990s are two peri-
ods when, in retrospect, large shifts in the natural rate of unemployment
apparently occurred. The authors document that contemporary observers
were slow to adjust their beliefs in both those periods. They cite Herbert
Stein, Paul McCracken, and Arthur Burns as distinguished economic
policymakers who, looking back, recognized their overoptimism in the
1970s. And they show that, in the 1990s, most professional forecasters, as
well as the Congressional Budget Office and the Council of Economic
Advisers, only belatedly reduced their estimates of the natural rate in the
1990s. 
To see what difference the design of policy can make in episodes like
these, the authors compare the performance of the Taylor, generalized, and
robust rules for stylized versions of the two periods. They assume that in
the 1970s both natural rates increased by 1.5 percentage points over a two-
and-a-half-year period, at the beginning of which policymakers knew the
true levels of both rates. Given the speed of adjustment implied by the
authors’Kalman ﬁlter model, errors in estimates of the natural rates grow
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Following the original Taylor rule in the presence of these perception
errors results in persistent inflation, as the policymaker strives for an
extended period to achieve what is in fact too low a level of unemploy-
ment. The revised Taylor rule, which increases the policy response to the
unemployment gap, does worse. The generalized rule, optimized for the
optimistic view that there are no perception errors, does little better. How-
ever, the robust rule, which ignores estimates of the unemployment gap,
results in much less persistent inﬂation with a very minor cost in increased
unemployment. For the purposes of the authors’experiment, the 1990s
are treated as the mirror image of the 1970s, and the results are a mirror
image of the 1970s results as well. Following the generalized rule, again
optimized on the assumption of no errors, results in deflation, with infla-
tion falling by almost 6 percentage points and staying well below its initial
value for many years. By contrast, the robust rule produces an outcome
much like the “Goldilocks” experience that actually occurred. The authors
thus see the contrast between actual policy behavior in these two periods
as illustrating and supporting their analytical results favoring their differ-
ence rule. 
The nations of Europe have become increasingly integrated during
the past decade, first through strengthening trade and investment ties
within the European Union and then through the buildup to and eventu-
ally the adoption of the euro as a common currency. Many of the promised
benefits of this greater integration have been apparent for years. But the
economic stabilization problems that had worried many have recently
emerged and become a source of controversy. In the third paper of this
issue, Olivier Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi call attention to a devel-
opment that was less widely anticipated and that has thus far received lit-
tle notice, namely, the growing dispersion in the size of current account
balances among European nations. 
As a formal backdrop for their empirical work, Blanchard and
Giavazzi present a traditional two-period model of how current account
positions evolve, which they adapt to the particular circumstances of
emerging monetary union among countries with very different initial
positions. In the model, saving and investment in each country are deter-
mined by households allocating consumption over time subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint. In each period, consumption in all coun-
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budget constraint and a utility function determine consumption over the
two periods. For this setup the authors show that the current account bal-
ance for each country depends negatively on the growth of its real income
relative to growth in world income, negatively on the interest rate the
country confronts relative to interest rates paid by other countries, and
positively on the elasticity of the demand for the country’s goods. This
simple model captures what the authors see as the principal mechanisms
through which greater economic integration, particularly monetary union,
would affect current accounts. They assume that a less advanced economy
entering the union will grow faster than the average economy, as its con-
vergence toward the income level of the more advanced economies is has-
tened by joining the union; that it would find its interest rate falling
toward rates in other economies as exchange rate risk is eliminated; and
that it would find that greater trade integration increases the price elas-
ticity of demand for the goods it produces, making it easier to repay cur-
rent borrowing with future trade surpluses. The model predicts that each
of these main developments pushes the less advanced economy’s current
account into deficit. 
The authors assess recent developments in Europe against these pre-
dictions. They ﬁrst examine panel data for three successively more focused
country groupings. The first, which they call OECD minus, includes
twenty-two of the thirty countries of the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, including all the European members except
Luxembourg, Turkey, and the Central European countries. (Luxembourg is
an unusual case, with reported current account surpluses consistently
around 30 percent of GDP; Turkey is much less developed than the other
European OECD countries; and the Central European countries lack ade-
quate data.) The second grouping, consisting of fourteen countries, is the
European Union, again excluding Luxembourg. The third is the euro area,
consisting of the twelve countries that have adopted the euro, again
excluding Luxembourg. A fourth grouping, which the authors calls euro
minus, omits Greece and Portugal to test whether results for the euro area
arise entirely from the inclusion of these two poorest members. The cur-
rent account data are from the European Commission’s Annual Macro-
economic Database (AMECO) and are based on countries’ national
income accounts. The authors report that their results are much the same
when the alternative data set published by the OECD is used. 
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cross-country variation in current accounts. They find that annual cross-
country standard deviations of current accounts for 1975–2000 rise
steadily for all four groupings after the mid-1980s. Before that, in the early
1980s, a sharp rise in the standard deviation is seen, followed by a decline.
This earlier rise and fall is driven by large deficits in Ireland and Portu-
gal, which Blanchard and Giavazzi argue arose from temporary shocks and
were unsustainable. They therefore first focus their attention on the years
starting in 1985. For two subperiods, 1985–93 and 1994–2000, they esti-
mate cross-country regressions of current account balances on income
per capita. For each country grouping the coefficient is positive in each
period, and larger in the second, consistent with their model’s prediction
that with integration poorer countries should run current account deficits.
The prediction is also supported by panel regressions for the entire
1975–2001 period that, for each year and country, relate the current
account–to–GDP ratio to income per capita relative to that in the entire
group, and to a common time effect and two variables that control for
effects of the dependency ratio and cyclical movements in output in each
country. The effect of relative income per capita is allowed to vary over
time, providing a test of whether integration strengthens the effect of rel-
ative income on current accounts. With this speciﬁcation, the authors ﬁnd
a strengthening effect after the mid-1980s for all groupings except OECD
minus. The relation appears equally strong for the euro area whether or not
Portugal and Greece are included. By the mid-1990s the coefficient in
regressions using data for the EU group is statistically and economically
signiﬁcant. At its 2000 value of 0.2, this coefﬁcient indicates that a coun-
try with an income per capita 40 percent below the EU average, roughly
the position of Portugal and Greece, should have a current account ratio
8 percentage points below the EU average. For the euro area the effect is
even larger. 
Some alternative specifications support these basic findings. Unless
Ricardian equivalence holds, the model predicts that public saving, like
household saving, should be positively related to current account balances.
Adding to the regressions the ratio of structural primary government bud-
get balances to GDP, the authors ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relation for all
groupings. For the OECD grouping, a 1-percentage-point rise in the bud-
get balance ratio leads to a 0.2-percentage-point increase in the current
account ratio. The previously estimated effect of income per capita is lit-
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indicating that the increased divergence in current accounts is not
explained by a growing divergence in public saving across countries. Sim-
ilarly, adding the Central European countries to the sample (useful data for
which begin only in the early 1990s) also confirms the main results.
Finally, the authors add M3, a broad measure of money, to their current
account regressions as an additional control variable that proxies for the
borrowing opportunities available to domestic residents and firms. They
find that M3 is strongly negatively related to current account balances,
and they infer that internal financial liberalization plays an independent
role in determining the distribution of current account balances across
countries.
The authors next address whether saving or investment is the main
channel through which the current account is affected. To do this they
alternately substitute ﬁrst the saving-to-GDP ratio and then the investment-
to-GDP ratio for the current account–to–GDP ratio as the dependent vari-
able in their basic pooled regression. In regressions explaining the
saving-to-GDP ratio, the coefﬁcient on relative income per capita is, after
the mid-1980s, positive with a rising trend for the euro area, positive but
with a weaker trend for the European Union, and neither significant nor
showing a trend for the OECD. In regressions explaining the investment-
to-GDP ratio, the sign on income is generally negative, as the model pre-
dicts, but the authors find no well-defined trend in the coefficient. In all
groupings some downward trend begins by 1995, but there is severe
volatility before that. The authors conclude that the increased dependence
of the current account on income per capita reflects mainly effects oper-
ating through saving rather than through investment. 
To explore the mechanisms behind these panel data results, Blanchard
and Giavazzi look more closely at the experience of Portugal and Greece.
To minimize the effects of cyclical factors on the current account, they
choose 1985–91 as the base period for Portugal and compare performance
then with performance in 1996–2001, a period when integration was well
advanced. They first calculate changes between these periods in the aver-
age values of the current account, investment, and several components of
saving, all expressed as ratios to GDP. The current account balance
declined by 10.6 percentage points of GDP, reﬂected in a 2.8-percentage-
point increase in investment and a 7.8-percentage-point decline in saving.
In allocating this saving decline, the authors adjust the government surplus
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ernment debt denominated in domestic currency (roughly half of total gov-
ernment debt in all years). On the assumption that this portion of the debt
is entirely owned by domestic households, they subtract the same amount
from household saving. With these adjustments, which move over 5 per-
centage points of the reduction in saving from households to the govern-
ment, 2.2 percentage points of the decline in saving came from a reduction
in the government’s surplus, 3.8 percentage points from a decline in house-
hold saving, and 1.8 percentage points from a decline in corporate saving. 
The authors see increased borrowing by Portuguese households as a key
factor in the decline in household saving. From 1995 to the end of 2001,
household debt, mainly in the form of mortgages and consumer loans,
increased from 40 percent to 93 percent of GDP. Finding no evidence of
substantive changes in the types of financial products available over this
period, the authors conclude that falling interest rates are the main factor
behind this rise in indebtedness. Between 1992 and the end of the period,
annual short-term interest rates fell from 16 percent to 4 percent, and real
short-term rates fell from 6 percent to near zero. The authors attribute
much of this decline to ﬁnancial integration, which eliminated country risk
and opened the euro interbank loan market to subsidiaries of Portuguese
banks. In 2000 the net increase in foreign indebtedness of Portuguese
banks amounted to 10.7 percent of GDP, which is more than the current
account deficit in that year and much larger than all other portfolio and
investment ﬂows. 
Net foreign direct investment, which had been an important source of
capital inflows in the mid-1980s when Portugal entered the European
Union, turned negative by the mid-1990s. Since then inflows have
increased rapidly, but outﬂows have increased even more. The authors pro-
vide an interesting interpretation of these developments. Outflows have
mainly taken the form of acquisitions, with over 40 percent going to
Brazil. Portugal’s bankers presumably have a comparative advantage in
understanding and dealing with Brazilian firms. When this long-standing
special relation was coupled with Portugal’s newfound ability to raise
funds in the euro area capital market, it led to substantial European direct
investment in Brazil being carried out through Portugal, giving rise to both
inﬂows and outﬂows of capital. 
For their analysis of Greece, Blanchard and Giavazzi use 1981–91 as
their base period and compare it with 1996–2001, omitting the intervening
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the current account to GDP fell by 3.5 percentage points; all of this decline
is attributed to a decrease in saving, which was also the most important
factor in Portugal’s experience. However, the allocation of the saving
decline in Greece is very different from that in Portugal. Adjusting the
government deficit for inflation, which again makes an important differ-
ence, and allocating the adjustment to households as before, the authors
find that the private saving ratio fell by 7.7 percentage points while the
government saving ratio rose by 4.3 percentage points. The available data
do not permit an allocation of private saving between households and cor-
porations before 1995. Between then and 2000 there was little change in
the household saving ratio, while the corporate saving ratio fell by 4.3 per-
centage points. 
Getting behind these numbers, the authors report that the decline in cor-
porate saving reflected a shift in the financing of firms from internal
finance to share issues: capital raised in the stock market rose from zero
in the mid-1990s to 8 percent of GDP in 2001. Over the same period the
outstanding volume of consumer loans as a fraction of GDP rose from
1.6 percent to 6 percent, and the volume of mortgage loans rose from
4.5 percent to 12 percent. The authors note that, in contrast to what hap-
pened in Portugal, domestic ﬁnancial liberalization facilitated this increase
in borrowing: before 1997, consumer loans were virtually prohibited in
Greece. Outward foreign direct investment has been about 3 percent of
GDP, with about one-third going to the other Balkan and Mediterranean
countries. Direct investment in Greece from abroad has been slightly
larger, resulting in small but positive net foreign direct investment into
Greece in recent years. The authors ﬁnd evidence that the move to the euro
has been important in making ﬁnancial investments in Greece more attrac-
tive: purchase of government bonds by foreigners has become one of the
main capital flows financing the current account deficit. The authors also
report that unit labor costs in both Greece and Portugal were little changed
between 1995 and 2001, and they conclude that changes in competitive-
ness were not an important factor affecting the current account in either
country. 
Although the authors thus see developments in Greece and Portugal as
broadly supporting both their stylized model and their findings based on
panel data, they recognize that Ireland, which also used to be much poorer
than the other EU countries, has had a different experience. They note
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lyzed in the Spring 2002 issue of the Brookings Papers, has enjoyed very
rapid GDP growth, which generated a large increase in government saving.
And they see this swing in the fiscal balance as the main factor account-
ing for the current account surpluses that Ireland has experienced. 
In a provocative 1980 paper, Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka
found that investment and saving within a country are highly correlated
over time. Such a correlation would be expected in a relatively closed econ-
omy but might be expected to decrease with the opening of capital markets.
Blanchard and Giavazzi revisit this issue by regressing investment-to-GDP
ratios on saving-to-GDP ratios for their four country groupings and for the
OECD as a whole (again omitting Luxembourg). The regressions are esti-
mated for the period 1975–2000 and allow for time variation both in the
intercept and in the key coefﬁcient relating saving and investment in each
country. For all their country groupings, they ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient relat-
ing saving to investment varies noticeably over time and clearly declines
in the later years of the sample, indicating that investment and saving are
becoming less correlated. For the European Union and the euro area, the
coefﬁcient has declined to zero or below by the end of the sample. 
The authors conclude by discussing whether the current account devel-
opments that they have analyzed should be a source of concern for
Europe’s policymakers. The most relevant of these concerns is how coun-
tries will have to adjust in the future to service or repay the capital flows
that correspond to present current account deficits. The need for eventual
trade surpluses will in due course require either a real depreciation or a
decline in domestic aggregate demand. With no scope within the euro
area for countries to pursue an independent monetary policy or to revalue
their currencies in nominal terms, this implies some combination of tighter
fiscal policy and inflation to worsen the terms of trade. The authors rea-
son that theory offers little guidance about when fiscal policy should be
adjusted. However, they argue that there is no case for tightening fiscal
policy now to eliminate the present current account deficits. Their model
suggests that these deﬁcits reﬂect a move toward optimal allocation of con-
sumption and investment over time. For this reason they view benign
neglect of today’s current account deﬁcits as a reasonable course of action.
After two decades during which it had been disappointingly slow,
productivity growth in the United States quickened dramatically during the
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over both short and medium horizons, economists were slow to recognize
this acceleration. But by now it is widely accepted, and attention has
turned to understanding its causes. In the ﬁnal paper of this issue, William
Nordhaus sheds some new light on this question using data on value added
by industry to construct measures of labor productivity that differ from
those commonly used by analysts. With this data set, which provides mea-
sures of output derived from the income rather than the product side of the
national accounts, he estimates productivity growth for the economy as
a whole, for the nonfarm business sector, and for that part of the economy
where real output is well measured. He also calculates the effects of
changing industry composition on measured productivity, and he creates
a new aggregate consisting of those sectors that include the “new econ-
omy,” to allow an assessment of the contribution of the new economy to
overall productivity.
The income-side data that Nordhaus uses are available by industry from
1977 through 2000. Most of his analysis breaks the period into three parts:
1977–89, 1989–95, and 1995–2000, the last being the period when
productivity accelerated sharply according to all indicators. Although
Nordhaus makes no attempt to adjust the data for the business cycle, the
breakpoints he chooses avoid any extremes of the cycle. Using data on
nominal output, real output, prices, and hours of work from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, he assembles the industry data into his new economy
and well-measured output aggregates and forms an income-side measure
for the nonfarm business sector to compare with the widely used Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) measure of nonfarm business productivity based on
product-side data. The largest difference between these two measures
occurs in the 1995–2000 period, when the income-side estimates grew
noticeably faster than the product-side estimates. As a result of this large
discrepancy in output estimates, and a smaller difference in estimates of
hours worked, productivity grew 0.4 percentage point a year faster in
Nordhaus’s estimates than in the ofﬁcial BLS data. For the earlier years the
two estimates of productivity growth are much closer. 
Nordhaus’s well-measured output omits those sectors of the economy
for which he judges output is measured too poorly to be useful in analyz-
ing productivity growth. In some of these sectors, such as government
and education, the official data make no serious attempt to measure out-
put and instead proxy it by an index of inputs such as employment. In other
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for deﬂating nominal magnitudes. In construction, insurance, and banking,
the price indexes used for deflation are not representative of the range of
outputs in the sector; in other sectors, which Nordhaus has identified in
discussions with experts inside and outside of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, the price indexes do not adequately capture quality change or the
introduction of new goods and services. 
Taking all these issues into account, Nordhaus excludes the following
major sectors from well-measured output: government and government
enterprises; construction; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services
other than software, other business services, hotels, and repair services.
The remaining, well-measured sectors accounted for 57 percent of nomi-
nal GDP in 1977 and 50 percent in 2000. By comparison, nonfarm busi-
ness output, the aggregate most commonly used in analyzing productivity,
remained about 75 percent of nominal GDP throughout 1977–2000.
Annual productivity growth for well-measured output averaged 2.0 per-
cent over 1977–89, noticeably faster than the 1.3 percent average for
(income-side) nonfarm business. Between 1977–89 and 1995–2000 there
was a 1.3-percentage-point speedup of productivity growth in well-
measured output, somewhat smaller than the 1.6-percentage-point speedup
for the nonfarm business sector. 
To analyze these developments further, Nordhaus starts from the obser-
vation that aggregate productivity growth reflects both changes in pro-
ductivity within sectors and changes in the composition of sectors within
aggregate output. To identify these sources of change, he breaks down pro-
ductivity growth in his income-side aggregates into three components: a
“pure productivity effect,” a “Baumol effect,” and a “Denison effect.” Now
that the National Income and Product Accounts use chain-weighted, or
Fisher, indexes to measure output and prices over time, these components
sum approximately to overall growth in labor productivity, omitting only
small interaction and second-order effects. The pure productivity effect is
given by the sum of productivity growth rates of different industries
weighted by their nominal output shares in a base year. It can be thought
of as the change in productivity that would occur if each industry’s share
of nominal output did not change. The Baumol effect, named for William
Baumol, who pioneered work on “unbalanced growth,” identiﬁes the effect
of changing industry output shares on overall productivity growth; it is
given by the sum of industry growth rates weighted by the departure over
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with slow productivity growth account for a rising share of nominal output
over time, as Baumol first reported, this in itself would reduce aggregate
productivity growth below that measured by the pure productivity effect.
Finally, the Denison effect is given by the sum of growth rates in industry
labor inputs weighted by the difference between the industries’shares of
nominal income and labor input. It captures the change in productivity that
arises from changing shares across industries with different levels of pro-
ductivity. This effect is named for Edward Denison, who first demon-
strated that the movement of workers from low-productivity agriculture
to high-productivity industry accounted for an important part of postwar
growth in Europe and elsewhere. 
For well-measured output, the speedup in the pure productivity effect
after 1995 is slightly larger than the total speedup in productivity growth,
indicating that none of the acceleration in productivity resulted, on bal-
ance, from sectoral reallocations. Also, annual growth from the pure pro-
ductivity effect averaged about 0.2 percentage point more than total
productivity growth throughout the 1977–2000 period. The results were
much the same for the entire nonfarm business sector. Interestingly, in both
the well-measured sectors and the nonfarm business sector, Denison
effects (plus small residuals) subtracted from productivity growth in all
three periods. Baumol effects alone added somewhat to productivity
growth in 1977–89 and were negligible thereafter. In Nordhaus’s words,
“Baumol’s cost disease has been cured, or at least is in remission.”
Nordhaus identifies four sectors where elements of the new economy
are concentrated: electronic and other electric equipment (which includes
communications equipment and semiconductors), industrial machinery
and equipment (which includes computer hardware), telephone and tele-
graph (telecommunications services), and software. In 1995–2000 the ﬁrst
two sectors recorded impressive accelerations in their own productivity,
while the other two had healthy but unspectacular productivity growth.
To measure the contribution of each sector to the acceleration of aggregate
productivity, Nordhaus constructs Fisher indexes of output and labor input
both for aggregates that include these industries and for properly scaled
aggregates that omit them. The difference in productivity growth between
them provides his measure of the contribution of the new economy to pro-
ductivity growth. Nordhaus’s analysis is thus limited to the direct contri-
bution of these industries through their own productivity growth and their
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reasons discussed below, he does not attempt to measure the contribution
of new economy goods and services to productivity growth in other indus-
tries through their application of new economy capital. 
Nordhaus then applies his method of isolating the contribution of new
economy sectors to his three economic aggregates: the total economy
(gross national income), the nonfarm business sector, and well-measured
output. In each of these he finds that the new economy sectors raised
productivity growth noticeably in each subperiod. However, he finds
they accounted for less of the productivity acceleration between 1977–95
and 1995–2000 than some other analysts have found. In well-measured
output, productivity growth quickened by 1.3 percentage points; the new
economy sectors accounted for 0.6 percentage point of this acceleration.
In the nonfarm business sector, productivity growth accelerated by 1.6
percentage points, with only 0.3 percentage point accounted for by the
new economy. And in the economy as a whole, productivity quickened by
1.0 percentage point, with the new economy accounting for 0.3 percent-
age point. The difference between total productivity growth and the part
of it attributed to the new economy shows that a substantial acceleration
of productivity occurred in industries outside the new economy. Among
individual industries, Nordhaus finds that three of the new economy
industries were among the top ten in their direct contribution to the pro-
ductivity acceleration. However, the three largest contributors were retail
trade, securities and commodities brokers, and wholesale trade—none of
which is part of the new economy as conventionally understood. Together
these three accounted for 1.05 percentage points of the 1.61-percentage-
point acceleration in the annual rate of productivity growth in nonfarm
business. 
Nordhaus recognizes that the total contribution of the new economy to
labor productivity includes the enhancement of productivity through the
application of new economy capital in industries that use that capital.
And he cites a number of studies that have recently found a very large
role for capital deepening in explaining the acceleration of productivity. In
their comments on the paper, both Robert Gordon and Daniel Sichel pro-
vide informative reconciliations of Nordhaus’s new findings with their
own updated results that incorporate estimates of the contribution of cap-
ital stocks to productivity growth using conventional product-side data.
However, Nordhaus offers some important reservations about such calcu-
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short-lived high-technology capital, for which there is little historical evi-
dence to gauge service ﬂows, dominated the data on the growth of capital
services; the user cost of capital calculated from interest rates in these
models was exaggerated because it ignored the cheap finance available
from high equity prices; and the stock market boom led to unproductive
overinvestment in some industries. Using pooled regressions that explain
sectoral output growth with growth of both net capital stocks and labor,
he buttresses these misgivings by showing that the role of capital stocks
in explaining sectoral output is not well identiﬁed. 
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